Further Reflections on Sentences Saying of Themselves Strange Things

• Authors: Zardini Elia
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Milne [2005] argued that a sentence saying of itself that it does not have a truthmaker is true but does not have a truthmaker. López de Sa and Zardini [2006] worried that, by parity of reasoning, one should conclude that a sentence saying of itself that it is not both true and short is true but not short. Recently, Milne [2013] and Gołosz [2015] have replied to López de Sa and Zardini’s worry, arguing in different ways that the worry is illfounded. In this paper, I’ll address these replies and argue that they fail to dispel López de Sa and Zardini’s worry, bringing out in the process some broader points concerning the use of self-referential sentences in arguments in philosophy of logic.

Keywords

EN

diagonalisation; factivity; incompleteness; necessitation; reductio ad absurdum; semantic paradoxes; truthmaking

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń)
• Journal: Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Year: 2017
• Volume: 26
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 563–581

Dates

published

2017-12-15

Contributors

author

Zardini Elia

• LanCog, Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group, Centro de filosofia, Universidade de Lisboa

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.12775/LLP.2017.004