Miejsce i rola kryteriów w filozofii Wittgensteina

• Authors: Wawrzyniak Jan

Title variants

The role of criteria in Wittgenstein’s philosophy

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

The main objective of this article is to explain the role of the concept of a ‘criterion’ in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy. To do so, the author juxtaposes a few well‑known interpretations of this issue, and compares the notion of a criterion with the notion of a rule. Contrary to Peter M.S. Hacker’s reading, he points out that according to Wittgenstein, to give the ‘criteria of use’ of an expression is to determine its ‘grammar’. To meet the criteria does not merely mean justifying the fact that a given thing occurs, but means that a given expression has an application under the particular conditions. Thus, there is no difference between the determination of the criteria of an expression’s use and the explication of its meaning. It should be noted that the fact that the expression ‘x’ has an application in a given situation does not always imply that the sentence ‘this is x’ is also true in this situation. The Wittgensteinian notion of a criterion is a semantical rather than an epistemological concept. Therefore, the conceived criteria cannot be used to reject scepticism, if by rejecting it we mean demonstrating its falsity. According to Wittgenstein, we can show at most that a sceptic, who rejects all criteria of use of words, cannot frame any doubts.

Keywords

EN

Ludwig Wittgenstein; criterion; rule; meaning; grammar; theory of knowledge

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. KEN w Krakowie, Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
• Journal: ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
• Year: 2015
• Volume: Tom: 5
• Issue: Numer: 1
• Pages: 179-190

Dates

published

2015

Contributors

author

Wawrzyniak Jan

• Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. KEN w Krakowie, Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii

References

• Cavell, S. (1976). The availability of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. W: S. Cavell. Must we mean what we say (s. 64–100). New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Cavell, S. (2008). Sens późnej filozofii Wittgensteina. (T. Zarębski, Przeł.). Principia, 50, 113–145.
• Cavell, S. (1979). The claim of reason, Wittgenstein, scepticism, morality and tragedy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Cavell, S. (1990). The argument of the ordinary. W: S. Cavell. Conditions handsome and unhandsome. Chicago–London: The University of Chicago Press.
• Cook, J. (1969). Human beings. W: P. Winch (Red.). Studies in the philosophy of Wittgenstein (s. 117–151). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
• Hacker, P. M. S. (1986). Insight and illusion: Themes in the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Glock, H. (2001). Słownik Wittgensteinowski. (M. Hernik & M. Szczubiałka, Przeł.). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Spacja.
• Malcolm, N. (1981). Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigations. W: V. C. Chappell (Red.). The philosophy of mind (s. 74–100). New York: Dover Publications.
• McDowell, J. (1998). Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge. W: J. McDowell. Meaning, knowledge, and reality (s. 369–394). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
• Moore, G. E. (1990a). Dowód na istnienie świata zewnętrznego. W: G. E. Moore. O metodzie filozoficznej (s. 68–85). (W. Sady, Przeł.). Warszawa: Klub Otrycki.
• Moore, G. E. (1990b). Obrona zdrowego rozsądku. W: G. E. Moore. O metodzie filozoficznej (s. 16–35). (W. Sady, Przeł.). Warszawa: Klub Otrycki.
• Quine, W. V. O. (2000). Dwa dogmaty empiryzmu. W: W. V. O. Quine. Z punktu widzenia logiki (s. 49–75). (B. Stanosz, Przeł.). Warszawa: Fundacja Aletheia.
• Wittgenstein, L. (1989). Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie (t. 1). W: L. Wittgenstein, Werkausgabe (t. 7). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
• Wittgenstein, L. (1993). O pewności. (W. Sady, Przeł.). Warszawa: Fundacja Aletheia.
• Wittgenstein, L. (1998). Niebieski i brązowy zeszyt. (A. Lipszyc & Ł. Sommer, Przeł.). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Spacja.
• Wittgenstein, L. (2000). Dociekania filozoficzne. (B. Wolniewicz, Przeł.). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
• Wright, C. (1993a). Anti‑realist semantics: The role of criteria. W: C. Wright. Realism, meaning, and truth (s. 357–382). Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.
• Wright, C. (1993b). Second thoughts about criteria. W: C. Wright. Realism, meaning, and truth (s. 383–402). Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.
• Wright, C. (1993c). Truth conditions and criteria. W: C. Wright. Realism, meaning, and truth (s. 47–69). Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.