Two Dogmas of Rorty's Pragmatism

• Authors: Timo Vuorio
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Here I discuss two controversial distinctions that have an essential role in Rorty's pragmatism: the distinction between descriptive and normative discourses, and the distinction between the private and public dimensions of human life. Neither of them is Rorty's novelty, but the way he stresses them is unique. The first is a central presupposition of his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), while the other is the argumentative base of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989). I will argue that the distinctions provide metaphilosophical tools for Rorty's pragmatism, and that our stance towards the latter depends on the plausibility of them.

Keywords

EN

Rorty; pragmatism; normativity; descriptivity; private; public

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Human Affairs
• Year: 2009
• Volume: 19
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 87-95

Dates

published

2009-06-01

online

2009-03-21

Contributors

author

Timo Vuorio

• Department of History and Philosophy, University of Tampere, 33014, Finland

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Identifiers

DOI

10.2478/v10023-009-0024-x