Czy Uwaga Ekstensywna Jest Świadoma? o Relacjach Uwagi i Świadomości w Kontekście Teorii Stanów Uwagi

• Authors: Michał Wierzchoń , Aleksandra Gruszka

Title variants

Is Extensive Attention Conscious? An Essey on Relationships Between Attention and Consciousness in the Context of Attention States Theory

• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

PL

Relacja uwagi i świadomości jest jednym z najczęściej dyskutowanych problemów teoretycznych poruszanych w literaturze dotyczącej poznawczych podstaw świadomości. W dotychczasowych badaniach najczęściej przyjmowano założenie, zgodnie z którym uwaga jest niezbędnym warunkiem uświadomienia. Takie ujęcie może być jednak problematyczne, jeżeli przyjmiemy, że dostęp do świadomości ma charakter stopniowalny. Jeżeli bowiem możemy być w różnym stopniu świadomi, to nie jest pewne z jakim stopniem świadomości miałaby być związana uwaga. Obszar analiz jeszcze bardziej komplikuje przyjęcie założeń teorii stanów uwagi Kolańczyk. W proponowanym artykule omówimy konsekwencje przyjęcia założeń tej teorii dla opisu relacji pomiędzy uwagą i świadomością. Interesować nas będą przede wszystkim stany osłabionego dostępu do świadomości i uwagi nie skoncentrowanej (ekstensywnej). Analizie poddane zostaną wyniki badań neurobiologicznych, w których opisuje się stany uwagi podobne do stanu uwagi ekstensywnej, a także związek tych stanów ze świadomością. Omówimy również teoretyczne konsekwencje proponowanego ujęcia teoretycznego dla rozważań dotyczących funkcji uwagi i świadomości.

Keywords

EN

intensive - extensive attention; consciousness; meditation; mind wandering; resting state

PL

uwaga intensywna - ekstensywna; świadomość; medytacja; błądzenie umysłu; odpoczynek

• Publisher: Committee on Psychological Sciences PAS, Warsaw School of Social Psychology
• Journal: Psychological Studies
• Year: 2011
• Volume: 49
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 43-55

Dates

published

2011-01-01

online

2012-05-17

Contributors

author

Michał Wierzchoń

• Instytut Psychologii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński

author

Aleksandra Gruszka

• Instytut Psychologii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński

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Identifiers

DOI

10.2478/v10167-010-0026-8