What More is Folk Psychology?

• Authors: Tomasz Grzegorek , Tomasz Grzegorek
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Oridinary describing and explaining of everyday behavior became an object of systematic psychological study in the late-40s. The results create a picture of folk psychology as a primitive version of scientific psychology, kind of "naive" theory which is rather false. The picture represents folk psychology only as a speculative artefact, but there is also another notion of folk psychology as a basic conceptual schema which organizes experience. The specific scientific approach to folk psychology is described, some arguments against the view of folk psychology as a theory are pointed and the alternative notion of folk psychology is demonstrated in this article.

Keywords

EN

folk psychology; implicit theories; theory of mind

• Publisher: Committee on Psychological Sciences PAS, Warsaw School of Social Psychology
• Journal: Psychological Studies
• Year: 2011
• Volume: 49
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 49-60

Dates

published

2011-01-01

online

2011-09-22

Contributors

author

Tomasz Grzegorek

• Instytut Psychologii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński Kraków

author

Tomasz Grzegorek

• Instytut Psychologii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński Kraków

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Identifiers

DOI

10.2478/v10167-011-0004-9