On the variable of strategic culture: Modus operandi of military interventions in the Middle East

• Authors: Andrius Bivainis
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The research subject of this article is the variable of strategic culture that has been subjected to some academic inertia since the Cold War period. The aim of this article is to define practical implications of the strategic culture through the prism of the neoclassical realist theory. It supports the argument that military interventional precedents in the Middle East since 2011 have been revealing adaptive considerations of the strategic culture as an intervening variable that implies interventional military decisions by the U.S. and its coalition partners.

The first part of the article defines the precise role of this intervening variable as military interventional precedents are researched. This task is conducted by defining the general understanding of interventional initiatives, revealing structured assumptions of the neoclassical realist theory, and reconsidering the role of the strategic culture within that theoretical framework.

The second part of the article shifts the attention to supportive empirical considerations regarding the strategic culture and perception of operational ideas – two specifi cally highlighted neoclassical realist assumptions. The article discloses that Western strategic culture is a changing intervening variable with a different level of permissiveness. A changing continuum of permissiveness is implied by interventional experiences that shape perception of the structural environment and dictate preferences for the power scale of interventional decisions. From this, the level of the structural environment’s permissiveness is defined. This permissiveness is associated with capabilities for implementing political objectives without further escalations of military power. Once the systemic environment becomes more permissive, the possibility of activating military intervention of various force-escalation becomes more conceivable.

Keywords

EN

the neoclassical realist theory; military interventions; strategic culture; Middle; East

• Publisher: Akademia Sztuki Wojennej
• Journal: Security and Defence Quarterly
• Year: 2019
• Volume: 23
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 97-125

Dates

published

2019-03-28

Contributors

author

Andrius Bivainis

• Gen. Jonas Žemaitis Lithuanian Military Academy, Political Science Department

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Identifiers

DOI

10.35467/sdq/105431