W.V.O. Quine on Truth and Analyticity

• Authors: Cieslinski C.
• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

The critique of the concept of analyticity undertaken by Quine in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' met with various objections. In particular, he was criticized for certain alleged inconsistency. He was ready to accept an intra-linguistic definition of truth as truth-in-L for any established language L, but at the same time he required that the general notion of analyticity were conceived inter-linguistically and unrelativized to any language in question. The author attempts to defend Quine against this attack. He assumes that definitions are instruments introduced with a view to a purpose they should serve. It is essential therefore to find out what purpose was to be served by the introduction of the concept of analyticity by those authors who used it. The author tries to answer this question and focuses on the problem whether an intra-linguistic definition of analyticity serves the required function. Then he goes on to inquire if the inter-linguistic definition of truth serves its function. He argues in the end that the negative answer to the former question and the positive answer the latter are right and save Quine from the objections.

Keywords

EN

ANALYTICITY; MEANING POSTULATES; QUINE WILLARD VAN ORMAN; TRUTH

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Polska Akademia Nauk
• Journal: Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
• Year: 2008
• Volume: 17
• Issue: 4(68)
• Pages: 233-247
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Cieslinski C.

• C. Cieslinski, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmiescie 3, 00-047 Warszawa, Poland

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

09PLAAAA064112