K Heideggerově koncepci výpovědi a pravdy

• Authors: Přemysl Dvorský

Title variants

EN

On Heidegger’s Conception of Statement and Truth

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

This paper contributes to the discussion of Heidegger’s conception of statement which rejects the classical understanding of it as being the automatic place of truth and reveals it to be a phenomenon rooted in much deeper hermeneutical and, above all, temporal structures. The article systematises Heidegger’s conception of the three conditions for the untruthfulness of a statement in relation to its primary, that is apophantic, function. The conclusion is a fundamentally ontological conception of the statement which can be applied to the traditional dispute between Russell and Strawson about the statement the current king of France is bald. Fundamental ontology also reveals how the starting point of this dispute is incorrect. If one had to say that one said was right, however, truth would be closer to Russell and not to Strawson, as it is generally thought nowadays.

Keywords

EN

statement; truth; Heidegger

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2010
• Volume: 58
• Issue: 5
• Pages: 675-686
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Přemysl Dvorský

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic