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2019 | 2 | 65-82

Article title

The influence of illiberal democracy on the effectiveness of attempts to control lobbying in Hungary (2010–2014)

Authors

Content

Title variants

PL
Wpływ demokracji nieliberalnej na poziom efektywności kontroli działalności lobbingowej na Węgrzech (2010–2014)

Languages of publication

EN

Abstracts

EN
Lobbying, understood as all actions performed by or on behalf of interest groups directed at influencing of the process of policy formation and implementation, occurs in every political regime. The article examines whether the illiberal type of democracy that exists in Hungary (2010–2014) exerts an influence on the effectiveness of lobbying control. Illiberal democracy differs from liberal democracy with regard to five systemic core principles, such as the rule of law, government control and accountability, the integrity of political elites, media freedom and civil rights and protection of minorities. This article shows that all of these systemic criteria constituting illiberal democracy were met in Hungary between 2010–2014. Examination of the case of Hungary with regard to lobbying control suggests that illiberal democracy had diminished the effectiveness of lobbying control in this country.
PL
Zjawisko lobbingu, rozumiane jako wszystkie działania wykonywane przez bądź w imieniu grup interesu, ukierunkowane na oddziaływanie na proces podejmowania i implementowania decyzji politycznych, występuje w każdym reżimie politycznym. W niniejszym artykule zbadano czy nieliberalny model demokracji funkcjonujący na Węgrzech (2010–2014) wywierał wpływ na poziom efektywności działań mających na celu kontrolowanie lobbingu. Nieliberalna demokracja różni się od swego liberalnego odpowiednika w pięciu obszarach: rządów prawa, kontroli działań rządu i parlamentu przez niezależne od władz państwowych instytucje, poziomu korupcji wśród elit politycznych, stopnia wolności mediów oraz ochrony praw mniejszości. W artykule wykazano, że Węgry spełniały kryteria demokracji nieliberalnej dla każdego z obszarów w latach 2010–2014. Na podstawie przeprowadzonych badań stwierdzono, że nieliberalny model demokracji istniejący na Węgrzech zmniejszał efektywność kontroli działań lobbingowych w tym państwie.

Year

Issue

2

Pages

65-82

Physical description

Dates

published
2019-06-28

Contributors

  • Centrum Studiów Niemieckich i Europejskich im. Willy’ego Brandta Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego

References

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Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10_14746_ssp_2019_2_4
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