The Delisting of a Company from the Warsaw Stock Exchange as a Result of the Cancellation of the Dematerialisation of Shares – Tender Offer Price vs. IPO Price

• Authors: Sylwia Frydrych
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Theoretical background: The growth in the number of companies delisted from the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE), as a result of the cancellation of the dematerialisation of shares, has become a reason for considerations regarding the share price in tender offers addressed to shareholders who have held company securities since the Initial Public Offering (IPO).Purpose of the article: The goal of this study was to evaluate whether the price in tender offers of the shares of companies which had fially been excluded from trading on the WSE as a result of the cancellation of the dematerialisation of shares would ensure a positive rate of return for shareholders who have held the shares since this company’s debut on the regulated market of the WSE.Research methods: Public tender offers, announced between 2012 and 2018 on the regulated market of the WSE have been analysed. The analysis covered prices of shares of new listings on the WSE and share prices in the tender offers of 213 companies, out of which 55 companies have been excluded from trading on the regulated market of the WSE as a result of the cancellation of the dematerialisation of shares.Main findings: The results of the research indicate that more than a half of the shareholders who have held the securities of companies in their portfolio since their debut, have suffered losses after companies have been excluded from trading on the WSE as a result of the cancellation of the dematerialisation of shares. Only 11% of the examined companies have generated more than double profit for investors compared with the issue price during their IPO. This research is one of the few studies on the Polish stock market to the best of the author’s knowledge.

PL

Theoretical background: The growth in the number of companies delisted from the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE), as a result of the cancellation of the dematerialisation of shares, has become a reason for considerations regarding the share price in tender offers addressed to shareholders who have held company securities since the Initial Public Offering (IPO).Purpose of the article: The goal of this study was to evaluate whether the price in tender offers of the shares of companies which had finally been excluded from trading on the WSE as a result of the cancellation of the dematerialisation of shares would ensure a positive rate of return for shareholders who have held the shares since this company’s debut on the regulated market of the WSE.Research methods: Public tender offers, announced between 2012 and 2018 on the regulated market of the WSE have been analysed. The analysis covered prices of shares of new listings on the WSE and share prices in the tender offers of 213 companies, out of which 55 companies have been excluded from trading on the regulated market of the WSE as a result of the cancellation of the dematerialisation of shares.Main findings: The results of the research indicate that more than a half of the shareholders who have held the securities of companies in their portfolio since their debut, have suffered losses after companies have been excluded from trading on the WSE as a result of the cancellation of the dematerialisation of shares. Only 11% of the examined companies have generated more than double profit for investors compared with the issue price during their IPO. This research is one of the few studies on the Polish stock market to the best of the author’s knowledge.

Keywords

EN

Warsaw Stock Exchange; dematerialisation of shares; public tender offer

PL

Warsaw Stock Exchange; dematerialisation of shares; public tender offer

• Publisher: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej
• Journal: Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio H – Oeconomia
• Year: 2020
• Volume: 54
• Issue: 1

Dates

published

2020

online

2020-04-20

Contributors

author

Sylwia Frydrych

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.17951/h.2020.54.1.31-40