What’s the Point of Silent Blame?

• Authors: Mabel Holgado
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In this article I thoroughly examine Miranda Fricker’s account of blame based on Communicative Blame as a paradigm explanation of the practice by focusing my attention on a non-central case: silent blame. I argue that this kind of instance has not been successfully connected with her selected paradigm case so I propose a different “focal meaning” or rationale to better accommodate it as part of the entire range of cases of the practice of blaming. I begin my argument drawing upon Herbert L.A. Hart’s methodology on central and borderline cases as a more accurate way to address the complex structure of the concept of blame, since this approach is sensitive to borderline cases as well. I also argue that, although marginal, silent blame fulfils a purpose which must too be vindicated. Thus, following Hart’s suggestion on the value of studying borderline cases, I propose a more accurate reframing of the general point of the practice of blame as a mechanism to secure respect for ourselves.

Keywords

EN

Communicative Blame, central cases, borderline cases, practical point, respect

• Publisher: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej
• Journal: Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio K – Politologia
• Year: 2019
• Volume: 26
• Issue: 2

Dates

published

2019

online

2019-12-28

Contributors

author

Mabel Holgado

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.17951/k.2019.26.2.7-23