The Knower Paradox

• Authors: Zbigniew Tworak

Title variants

PL

Paradoks znawcy (The Knower Paradox)

EN

The Knower Paradox

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

The Knower Paradox is an element of the class of paradoxes of self-reference. It demonstrates that any theory Ó which (1) extends Robinson arithmetic Q, (2) includes a unary knowledge predicate K, and (3) contains certain elementary epistemic principles involving K is inconsistent. In this paper I present different versions of the Knower Paradox (both in the framework of the first-order arithmetic and in the modal logic). There are several solutions of the paradox. Some of them I discuss in detail, namely solution developed within modal logic, solution proposed by C. A. Anderson and solution proposed by P. Égré. The common defect of these proposals is that they developed a connection between the concepts of knowledge and provability. Finally, I suggest a solution using the basic ideas of the revision theory of definitions.

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
• Journal: Filozofia Nauki
• Year: 2011
• Volume: 19
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 29-47

Dates

published

2011-09-01

Contributors

author

Zbigniew Tworak