Neskorý Wittgenstein a problém vonkajšieho sveta

• Authors: Adam Greif

Title variants

EN

The Late Wittgenstein and the Problem of the External World

• Languages of publication: SK

Abstracts

The aim of this article is to determine how useful to us are the notes from the late work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, in dealing with one of the modern sceptical problems. By determining the usefulness I have in mind whether or not his thoughts and descriptions of everyday linguistic practice help solve the sceptical problem and, if so, in what way. The sceptical problem in question is the Cartesian argument about the external world – the argument of ignorance. We will endeavour to show that if we accept Wittgenstein’s remarks as adequate descriptions of epistemic practice, they will help to make it possible to block the argument in question. However, there arise questions of whether Wittgenstein’s descriptions of epistemic practice are adequate, on the one hand, and whether the sceptical claims about the external world really spring from this practice, on the other hand. I hold the view that these questions are basically empirical. This has the relatively unusual consequence that the worth of Wittgenstein’s thoughts, as well as the cogency of the problem of the external world, cannot be judged in a purely philosophical way.

Keywords

EN

Wittgenstein; scepticism; epistemic practice; justification; intuition

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 64
• Issue: 5
• Pages: 743-759
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Adam Greif

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic