BONJOUR’S INTERNALIST FOUNDATIONALISM AND EPISTEMIC VIRTUES

• Authors: Karaca Koray
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

BonJour’s argumentative strategy underlying his account of internalist empirical foundationalism posits a descriptive relation between an empirical belief and the corresponding sensory experience. I argue that his argumentative strategy makes it necessary to appeal to epistemic virtues, such as accuracy, simplicity and coherency, for the epistemic assessment of the foregoing relation. I also argue that the relevance of epistemic virtues to this assessment is due to what I call background beliefs in one’s belief-system. I thus conclude that BonJour’s argumentative strategy is misguided in the sense that it overlooks the role of background beliefs in the assessment of empirical beliefs in terms of epistemic virtues, meaning that there can be no basic empirical beliefs in the way suggested by BonJour.

Keywords

EN

BONJOUR; INTERNALIST FOUNDATIONALISM; EPISTEMIC VIRTUES

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filozofia (Philosophy)
• Year: 2023
• Volume: 78
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 77 – 85

Contributors

author

Karaca Koray

• University of Twente, Department of Philosophy, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, Netherlands

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5545-4443

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2023.78.2.1