Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

PL EN


2018 | 73 | 3 | 224 – 234

Article title

PAMÄŤ, REKOGNÍCIA A OSOBNÁ IDENTITA V KLASICKEJ INDICKEJ FILOZOFII

Content

Title variants

EN
Memory, recognition and personal identity in classical Indian philosophy

Languages of publication

SK

Abstracts

EN
The problems of the self (ātman) and personal identity over time were thoroughly analysed in the classical Indian philosophy. The Buddhist philosophers rejected the Brahmanical commitment to a permanent unitary self which persists through changes of body and mind, and held that the self is a mere conceptual or thought construction (prajñāpti): there is no reality in the self; when we look more closely at what we call ‘I’, we will find only a stream of perceptions. Contrarily, the orthodox (āstika) philosophers argue that many common phenomena like memory or recognitive perception (pratyabhijñā) could not take place, if the rememberer and knower were different. One must endure through time as the same identical subject to be able to remember, have desire, commitments, responsibility etc. In favour of the classical Brahmanical position the author argues that if a person is nothing more than a bundle of different fleeting psycho-physical states, none of them can be plausibly explained. The paper brings out also some connections between the Indian and the Western debates over the personal identity problem.

Year

Volume

73

Issue

3

Pages

224 – 234

Physical description

Contributors

  • Katedra filozofie a aplikovanej filozofie, Univerzita sv. Cyrila a Metoda v Trnave, Trnava, Slovak Republic

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.cejsh-384a094e-4062-4e3d-966e-7e56cd034365
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.