INFERENTIALISM WITHOUT NORMATIVITY

• Authors: Posłajko Krysztof , Grabarczyk Paweł
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In this paper we argue that inferentialist approach to meaning does not, by itself, show that meaning is normative in a prescriptive sense, and that the constitutive rules argument is especially troubling for this position. To show that, we present the proto-inferentialist theory developed by Ajdukiewicz and claim that despite the differences between his theory and contemporary inferentialism rules of language in both theories function more like classificatory devices than prescriptions. Inferentialists can respond by claiming that in their theory meaning is essentially social and hence normative, but we claim that then semantic normativity becomes derivative of social normativity.

Keywords

EN

AJDUKIEWICZ; INFERENTIALISM; NORMATIVITY OF MEANING

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2018
• Volume: 25
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 174 - 195

Contributors

author

Posłajko Krysztof

• Department of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Grodzka 5231-044, Krakow, Poland

author

Grabarczyk Paweł