The No-Spoiler Condition for Choice Correspondences

• Authors: Lahiri Somdeb
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

We show that any choice correspondence which satisfies the weak Pareto criterion and the Majority property must violate the no-spoiler condition. Subsequently we strengthen the weak Pareto criterion. We show that if the number of criteria or individuals or states of nature is odd, then there is no choice correspondence which satisfies this strengthened version of weak Pareto criteria, Majority property and no-loser spoiler condition. However if the number of criteria/individuals/states of nature is even, we need two more properties to ensure the impossibility result. The first of these two properties is top neutrality. The second property is top anonymity.

Keywords

EN

Choice correspondence; Pareto criterion

PL

Kryterium Pareto

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Katowicach
• Journal: Multiple Criteria Decision Making
• Year: 2019
• Volume: 14
• Pages: 60-74

Contributors

author

Lahiri Somdeb

• School of Petroleum Management. Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University. Gandhinagar, India

References

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Identifiers

ISSN

2084-1531