EN
The aim of the study is to explore the basic paradoxes of Nietzsche’s conception of freedom in Beyond Good and Evil from the perspective of Kant’s philosophy of freedom. The analysis of selected aphorisms shows that Nietzsche’s ambivalent statements regarding will and freedom are not expressions of inconsistency, but rather they outline a philosophy of freedom that takes the form of a liberating deconstruction of the idea of free will. At the same time, it turns out that in this philosophy one can read a radicalization of some Kantian motifs. These are scientist criticism, the autonomy of human being and the ethos of free self-determination stemming from it. On the other hand, Nietzsche transcends Kant by rejecting two strictly distinct spheres, as well as by emphasizing the legitimate plurality of speech acts regarding freedom. As a result, he succeeds in thinking freedom as an expression of human being in this world. Nietzsche’s philosophy of the will is often interpreted in a strictly naturalistic way. However, an interpretation of these Kantian features reveals the insufficiency of naturalistic interpretation of Nietzsche.