WIREDU CONTRA LEWIS ON THE RIGHT MODAL LOGIC

• Authors: Martens David B.
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This paper is a critical study of an argument put forward by Kwasi Wiredu in his engagement with C. I. Lewis on choosing the right modal logic for logical necessity. Wiredu argues that Lewis “could have been more adventurous modally with perfect logicality” and could justifiably have accepted S4 rather than being “to the last cautious of any system stronger than S2” (Wiredu 1979). I address terse, incomplete, and provocatively incongruous notes on Wiredu’s paper by (Makinson 1980) and (Humberstone 2011), as well as a paper by (Cresswell 1965) that Humberstone cites, and I draw on recent work by (Lewitzka 2015; 2016). I conclude that Wiredu’s argument cannot be accepted as sound but a variant argument can be accepted as sound.

Keywords

EN

LEWIS C. I.; EQUIVALENCE; IDENTITY; KWASI WIREDU; MODAL LOGIC

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2019
• Volume: 26
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 474 – 490

Contributors

author

Martens David B.

• University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, Private Bag 3, WITS 2050, South Africa

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2019.26307