SUSAN WOLF ON SUPEREROGATION AND THE DARK SIDE OF MORALITY

• Authors: Grigore Nora
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Wolf proposes supererogation as a solution for curbing the exaggerated demands of morality. Adopting supererogation is supposed to prevent us from considering that all morally good deeds are obligatory. Supererogation, indeed, makes some morally good deeds merely optional, saving the agent from the requirement of behaving as much as possible like a Moral Saint. But I argue that Wolf cannot use supererogation in service of her overall project, for two reasons. First, because implied in the concept of supererogation is that going beyond duty adds to our humanity rather than detract from it (as Wolf argues). Secondly, after analysing attempts to acclimatize supererogation in other theoretical frameworks, I conclude that supererogation can limit morality’s claims only if Wolf’s reasons of “individual perfection” can defeat moral reasons. I argue that a common scale of evaluation between moral and non-moral reasons is needed for their comparison, but Wolf explicitly rejects this way out.

Keywords

EN

MORALITY; MORAL SAINTS; SUPEREROGATION; SUSAN WOLF

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2022
• Volume: 29
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 200 – 218

Contributors

author

Grigore Nora

• -

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4035-5282

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29202