Podmiotowe uwarunkowania wolności realnej. Wokół Ingardenowskiej wersji kompatybilizmu

• Authors: Kobiela Filip

Title variants

EN

THE SUBJECTIVE ORIGIN OF REAL FREEDOM. ROMAN INGARDEN'S VERSION OF COMPATIBILISM

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

The paper presents and discusses Roman Ingarden's solution to the problem of free will vs. determinism. The solution is placed in the context of various philosophical positions related to the dilemma of determinism (hard determinism, libertarianism, compatibilism). Ingarden's position can be characterized as a non-revisionist compatibilism: the act of free will is understood as an event that is causally determined, but solely by internal causes. Freedom is thus conceived as a subject's independence from external causal determination. Real freedom (juxtaposed to the phenomenon of freedom) is ontologically possible in a moderately deterministic world containing relatively isolated systems. This theory does not require any revision of social practices based on the conviction of the existence of free will.

Keywords

EN

ROMAN INGARDEN; ETHICS; DETERMINISMUS; FREE WILL; COMPATIBILISM

• Publisher: Polska Akademia Umiejętności / Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 43
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 5-20

Contributors

author

Kobiela Filip

• Zakład Filozofii i Socjologii Turystyki, Akademia Wychowania Fizycznego, al.Jana Pawła II 78, 31-571 Kraków, Poland