UNDER-DETERMINATION, SCEPTICISM, AND REALISM

• Authors: Ladislav Koreň
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This study aims to articulate and compare the structure, presuppositions and implications of two paradigmatic sceptical arguments, i.e. arguments from under-determination of scientific theories by observational data (UA) and Cartesian-style arguments (CA) invoking sceptical scenarios of severe cognitive dislocation. Although salient analogies between them may prompt one to think that a unified diagnosis of what is amiss with them is called for, it will be argued that this may be a false hope, if those analogies do not underwrite a complete homology. That said, possible parallels of one promising anti-sceptical exposure of CA are pointed out for the case of UA, which conspire together to render the problem of under-determination less threatening than it could at first appear.

Keywords

EN

EVIDENCE; REALISM; SCEPTICISM; UNDER-DETERMINATION

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2014
• Volume: 21
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 145 – 167

Contributors

author

Ladislav Koreň

• FF univerzity v Hradci Králové, Náměstí Svobody 331, 500 03 Hradec Králové, Czech Republic