Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

PL EN


2011 | 14 | 5-14

Article title

Modalne argumenty teistyczne

Authors

Selected contents from this journal

Title variants

EN
MODAL THEISTIC ARGUMENTS

Languages of publication

PL

Abstracts

EN
The aim of Oppy’s paper is to provide a general ground for rejecting all kinds of modal theistic arguments. The author claims that all such arguments are question begging – before proving the existence of God (defined as a being which exists in every possible world) theistic modalist must assume it when choosing his account of logical space (no matter which modal theory it relies on: Lewis’ modal realism, ersatz modal realism, combinatorialism or fictionalism). Two concrete arguments, Plantinga’s ontological argument and Leftow’s cosmological argument, are examples given by Oppy – both have premises which justification must refer to a non-modal question “Does God actually exist?”, concerning the nature of logical space. Oppy rejects suggestion that problems with modal theistic arguments show that there is simply something wrong with our standard modal analyses in terms of possible worlds. According to Oppy, problems with higher-level judgments about the nature of logical space are problems with propositional attitudes, not with modality, and they need an analysis distinct from the analysis of ground-level modal judgments.

Contributors

author
  • Monash University, School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies (SOPHIS), Room W615, Menzies Building, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia.
translator

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.cejsh-c59fc2a5-38dc-404b-9525-525b816e02e8
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.