Kartezjańska koncepcja zwierzęcia-maszyny

• Authors: Paweł Pasieka

Title variants

EN

DESCARTES’S CONCEPTION OF BEAST-MACHINE

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

According to standard interpretations, Descartes asserted that animals were mere automata and did not feel pain. This interpretation is based on his notion of the beast-machine. In this article, I revise John Cottingham’s sevenfold analysis of that thesis. In Cottingham’s view, Descartes did insist that animals were automata and denied them consciousness and self-consciousness but it did not involve that animals do not feel. I support this view with some new arguments. I also point to the difference between Descartes’s original conception of animal and animality and the standpoint of his followers.

Keywords

EN

DESCARTES; CONCEPTION OF BEAST-MACHINE; JOHN COTTINGHAM; ANIMAL; CONSCIOUSNESS; SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

• Publisher: Oficyna Wydawnicza Epigram
• Journal: Filo-Sofija
• Year: 2012
• Volume: 12
• Issue: 2(17)
• Pages: 51-64

Contributors

author

Paweł Pasieka