HUME ON THE LIMITS OF REASON IN THE REALM OF THE PRACTICAL: SOME ARISTOTELIAN OBSERVATIONS

• Authors: Kuna M.
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This essay examines critically the impact of Hume's conception of reason on ethics. In Hume's empirical ethics, the role traditionally attributed to reason is played by sentiment. Hume's conception of reason and its ethical implications are presented and possible objections to the limits he imposed on the role of reason in ethics are indicated. This analysis relies on Aristotelian arguments, and suggests that reason seems to play a more significant role in human action than Hume claimed. The paper concludes that showing Hume's restrictions on reason in human action as incorrect remains a genuine possibility.

Keywords

EN

ARISTOTLE; EMPIRICAL ETHICS; HUMAN GOOD; HUME; MORAL SENTIMENTS; PRACTICAL REASON

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2007
• Volume: 14
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 303-319
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Kuna M.

• M. Kuna, for postal address contact the journal editor

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

07SKAAAA03266746