Stanowisko nieredukcyjne w sporze o tożsamość osobową

• Authors: Grygianiec Mariusz

Title variants

EN

The Simple View of Personal Identity (in Polish)

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

In the debate on personal identity, different criteria of identity are proposed and defended. The criteria of identity have usually been taken to state the necessary and sufficient conditions of identity and are interpreted as providing truth conditions for relevant identity statements. The Simple View of personal identity is the thesis that there are no noncircular and informative metaphysical criteria of identity for persons. The paper intends to first deliver a precise and general formulation of the Simple View, and, second, to present the various arguments in favour of the doctrine in question. It argues that there are no other facts of the matter than identity itself which could serve as the truth-conditions of identity statements. The considerations presented in the paper lead to the conclusion that, although the Simple View is faced with many theoretical difficulties, it is still a lively intellectual position in the debate on personal identity.

Keywords

PL

tożsamość osobowa; pogląd nieredukcyjny; kryteria identyczności; warunki prawdziwości; osoba,; identyczność; genidentyczność; trwanie; czas; Jonathan E. Lowe; Roderick M. Chisholm; Trenton Merricks; Harold W. Noonan; Eric T. Olson; Michael Jubien

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii - Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Diametros
• Year: 2018
• Issue: 57
• Pages: 23-38

Dates

published

2018-09

Contributors

author

Grygianiec Mariusz

Identifiers

ISSN

ISSN 1733-5566

DOI

10.13153/diam.1234