Logic, Reasoning, Argumentation: Insights from the Wild

• Authors: Zenker Frank
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This article provides a brief selective overview and discussion of recent research into natural language argumentation that may inform the study of human reasoning on the assumption that an episode of argumentation issues an invitation to accept a corresponding inference. As this research shows, arguers typically seek to establish new consequences based on prior information. And they typically do so vis-à-vis a real or an imagined opponent, or an opponent-position, in ways that remain sensitive to considerations of context, audiences, and goals. Deductively valid inferences remain a limiting case of such reasoning. In view of these insights, it may appear less surprising that allegedly “irrational” behavior can regularly be produced in experimental settings that expose subjects to standardized reasoning tasks.

Keywords

EN

argumentation; fallacy; inference; reasoning

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń)
• Journal: Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Year: 2018
• Volume: 27
• Issue: 4 Special Issue on Logic, Cognition, Argumentation. Guest Editors: Mariusz Urbański, Michiel van Lambalgen and Marcin Koszowy
• Pages: 421-451

Dates

published

2018-12-15

Contributors

author

Zenker Frank

• Philosophy & Cognitive Science, Lund University Box 192, 22100 Lund, Sweden
• Konstanz University, Philosophy Box D9, 78457 Konstanz, Germany
• SAS, Institute of Philosophy Klemensova 19, 81364 Bratislava, Slovakia

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