Problems of Deep Disagreement

• Authors: Karimov Artur Ravilevich
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Deep disagreement is a disagreement about epistemic principles, pertaining to the methods of justification and argumentation. Relying on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concep- tual metaphor of “hinges,” researchers arrive at the conclusion that deep disagreement cannot be resolved. This conclusion leads to relativism in the theory of argumentation. The aim of the article is to show that in the situation of deep disagreement it is theoreti- cally possible to ascertain which of the positions of the participants of the argument has a better epistemic status, and hence, is argumentatively virtuous.

Keywords

EN

Argumentation; theory of argumentation; argumentative virtues; hinge epistemology; Ludwig Wittgenstein; intellectual virtues

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk; Fundacja Filozofia Na Rzecz Dialogu
• Journal: Dialogue and Universalism
• Year: 2019
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 239-242

Contributors

author

Karimov Artur Ravilevich

• Department of Social Philosophy, Kazan Federal University, Kremlevskaya St., 35, 420008 Kazan, Russia.