Racjonalność, normatywne zaangażowanie i autonomia podmiotu

• Authors: Tomasz Kwarciński

Title variants

EN

Rationality, Commitment and Autonomy

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

Amartya K. Sen is criticised for a modification of mainstream rational choice theory by an introduction of the commitment concept. This kind of modification sometimes is treated as a mistake. This article attempts to interpret the Amartya Sen’s concept of rationality. The means to this end will be an analysis of the ways of explanation of socalled Sen’s mistake. Three critical approaches to Sen’s concept of rationality made by Philip Pettit, Daniel Hausman and Geoffrey Brenan will be examined. In conclusion Sen’s concept of rationality, which includes the concept of commitment, should be interpreted as an approach which provides a subject with an autonomous expression of oneself, agency, responsibility and skills of critical thinking.

Keywords

EN

rationality; commitment; autonomy; subjectivity

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk / Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego
• Journal: Prakseologia
• Year: 2014
• Issue: 156
• Pages: 297-325

Contributors

author

Tomasz Kwarciński

• Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Krakowie, ul. Rakowicka 27, 31-510 Kraków

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