Composition as identity and plural Cantor's theorem

• Authors: Bohn Einar Duenger
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In this paper, I argue that the thesis of Composition as Identity blocks the plural version of Cantor’s Theorem, and that this in turn has implications for our use of Cantor’s theorem in metaphysics. As an example, I show how this result blocks a recent argument by Hawthorne and Uzquiano, and might be turned around to become an abductive argument for Composition as Identity

Keywords

EN

composition as identity; Cantor’s theorem; mereology; modal realism; necessitism

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń)
• Journal: Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 25
• Issue: 3 Mereology and Beyond (II)
• Pages: 411-428

Dates

online

2016-05-19

Contributors

author

Bohn Einar Duenger

• University of Agder, Kristiansand, Norway

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.12775/LLP.2016.009