Kontrakty jako narzędzia regulowania zachowań ekonomicznych – propozycje Olivera Harta i Bengta Holmströma

• Authors: Noga Adam

Title variants

EN

Contracts as a Tool for Regulating Economic Behavior - Proposals by Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström

RU

Контракты как инструмент регулирования экономического поведения – предложения Оливера Харта и Бенгта Хольстрема

• Languages of publication: PL
• Publisher: Komitet Nauk Ekonomicznych PAN, Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne
• Journal: Ekonomista
• Year: 2017
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 84-97

Contributors

author

Noga Adam

• Prof. dr hab. Adam Noga – Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie

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