Czy termin „osoba” jest niekompletny semantycznie? Krytyka stanowiska Christiana Kanziana

• Authors: Ziemowit Gowin

Title variants

EN

Is “Person” a Semantically Incomplete Term? Against Christian Kanzian’s Proposal

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

In my paper I aim to show that Christian Kanzian’s conception of the semantic character of a term “person” is false. According to Kanzian, the term “person” is an incomplete general term which needs to be combined with another general term, namely “Homo sapiens” or “human being”. Unlike the former, the latter terms give us clear criteria for identification of the entities they denote. Given that, we can comprehend how the term “person” is used for both synchronic and diachronic identification. After presenting the Kanzian’s proposal, I move on to my critique. In a nutshell, I show that his conception rules out non-human persons a priori and that the term “person” is: (i) general, (ii) semantically incomplete, (iii) non-sortal and (iv) phasic.

Keywords

EN

personal identity; person; ontology of personhood; complex view; simple view

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
• Journal: Edukacja Filozoficzna
• Year: 2017
• Issue: 63
• Pages: 59-74

Contributors

author

Ziemowit Gowin

• Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Warszawski, ul. Krakowski Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warszawa

References

• Baker L. R.: Persons and Bodies. A Constitution View. Nowy Jork, Cambridge University Press 2000.
• Bremer J.: Osoba – fikcja czy rzeczywistość? Tożsamość i jedność Ja w świetle badań neurologicznych. Kraków, Wydawnictwo Aureus 2014.
• Chisholm R.: The Loose and Popular and the Strict and philosophical Senses of Identity, w: Perception and Identity, red. N. Care, H. Grimm. Cleveland, Case Western Reserve University Press 1969, s. 82–106.
• Dennett D.: Conditions of Personhood, w: The Identities of Persons, red. A. O. Rorty. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press 1980, s. 175–196.
• Garrett B.: Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness. Nowy Jork, Routledge 2002.
• Gasser G., Stefan M.: Introduction, w: Personal Identity: complex or simple?, red. G. Gasser, M. Stefan. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2012, s. 1–17.
• Grygianiec M.: Substancjalność osób, w: Substancja, red. M. Piwowarczyk .Wrocław, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego 2012, s. 159–192.
• Grygianiec M: Kryteria tożsamości osobowej a tak zwany pogląd prosty, „Ethos” 1(101) (2013), s. 124–136.
• Hasker W.: The Emergent Self. Ithaca, Cornell University Press 1999.
• Jane S.: Personal identity: the simple view. Durham Theses, Durham 1993. Dostępna na Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/5615/.
• Kanzian C.: Is “person” a sortal term?, w: Personal Identity: complex or simple?, ed. G. Gasser, M. Stefan. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2012, s. 192–205.
• Lowe E. J.: Subjects of experience, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2006.
• Lowe E. J.: Personal Agency. The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2008.
• Lowe E. J.: The probable simplicity of personal identity, w: Personal Identity: complex or simple?, ed. G. Gasser, M. Stefan. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2012, s. 137–155.
• Meixner U.: The Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psycho-Physical Dualism, Paderborn, Mentis 2004.
• Meixner U.: Classical Dualism Modernized – A proposal, w: Dualistic Ontology of the Human Person, red. M. Szatkowski. München, Philosophia, s. 15–22.
• Merricks, T.: There Are No Criteria of Identity Over Time, „Nous” 32 (1998), s. 106–124.
• Morton A.: Why there is no Concept of a Person, w: The Person and the Human Mind, ed. C. Gill. Oxford, Clarendon Press 1990, s. 39–59.
• Noonan W. H.: Personal Identity, New York, Routledge 1991.
• Olson E. T.: A Compound of Two Substances, w: Soul, Body, and Survival. Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons, red. K. Corcoran, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press 2001, s. 73–88.
• Olson E. T.: What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, New York, Oxford University Press 2007.
• Snowdon P.: Persons, Animals, Ourselves. Oxford, Oxford University Press 2014.
• Strawson P. F.: Indywidua: próba metafizyki opisowej, przeł. B. Chwedeńczuk. Warszawa, Instytut Wydawniczy PAX 1980.
• Swinburne R.: Personal Identity. „Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society” 74 (1974), s. 231–247.
• Inwagen P. v.: Material Beings. New York, Cornell University Press 1995.