Investigating the role of customer churn in the optimal allocation of offensive and defensive advertising: the case of the competitive growing market.

• Authors: Machowska Dominika
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Keywords

EN

Lanchester model; Markovian Nash equilibrium; defensive and offensive; advertising; potential market; customer churn

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu
• Journal: Economics and Business Review
• Year: 2018
• Volume: 4(18)
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 3-23

Dates

published

2018-05-25

Contributors

author

Machowska Dominika

• University of Lodz, Faculty of Economics and Sociology, Department of Econometrics, Łódź, Poland

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Identifiers

DOI

10.18559/ebr.2018.2.1