Reflections about Too Big to Fail Banks and Moral Hazard

• Authors: Pawłowicz Leszek
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Several reflections and suggestions concerning the planned regulations aimed at limiting moral hazard done by TBTF banks were presented in this article. The scope of reflection is mainly the effectiveness of implementation of a resolution regime. To allow effective implementation of the resolution process probably the TLAC (Total Loss Absorbing Capacity) mechanism will be used. The mechanism will, according to the author, probably start the division of TBTF banks due to additional capital restrictions. If the division mechanism of two banks from the G-SIB group were to start it would be enough to be moderately optimistic when it comes to limiting moral hazard in banking.

Keywords

EN

Financial crisis; Moral hazard; Stabilisation policy; Standards of banking supervision; Conference materials

PL

Kryzys finansowy; Pokusa nadużycia; Polityka stabilizacyjna; Standardy nadzoru bankowego; Materiały konferencyjne

• Publisher: Bankowy Fundusz Gwarancyjny
• Journal: Bezpieczny Bank
• Year: 2015
• Issue: 3 (60)
• Pages: 78-88

Contributors

author

Pawłowicz Leszek

• Gdansk University of Gdansk
• Institute for Market Economics

References

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