Ryzyko, efekty zewnętrzne i konflikty interesów w strukturze kapitałowej banków – ujęcie teoretyczne

• Authors: Anna Doś , Monika Wieczorek-Kosmala
• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

The goal of this paper is to demonstrate the complexity of collocation of dependencies between bank capital structure decisions, risk and externalities. The dependencies are studied in the context of conflicts of interests. The paper synthesizes and systemizes main issues connected with bank capital structures: market discipline, market failure as well as regulation and it’s limitations. The conclusion is that bank capital structure decisions deserve interdisciplinary studies, including behavioral studies and social studies with the exploitation if qualitative methods.

Keywords

PL

konflikt interesów, dyscyplina rynkowa, regulacje

EN

conflict of interest, market discipline, regulation

• Publisher: Komitet Nauk o Finansach PAN
• Journal: FINANSE Czasopismo Komitetu Nauk o Finansach PAN
• Year: 2016
• Issue: 1(9)
• Pages: 233-255

Contributors

author

Anna Doś

• Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Katowicach

author

Monika Wieczorek-Kosmala

• Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Katowicach

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