Benefits and Costs of Vertical Separation in Network Industries. The Case of Railway Transport in the European Environment

• Authors: Marcin Król
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The article is devoted to a phenomenon called vertical separation in the area of network industries. Vertical separation is understood as de-merging of infrastructure and delegating control over it to independent manager banned from operating on downstream markets which are subject to liberalisation. Arguments for and against these tendencies have been examined using the example of the European railway transport. The complete analysis presents vertical separation as a promising solution for the railway industry. One of the conditions for the success of this reform is forming of a close cooperative relationship, based on loyalty and trust, between the infrastructure manager and its clients – rail operators. Building such a relationship should be supported by the implemented regulatory policy.

Keywords

EN

network industries; public utilities; railway transport; economic regulation; liberalisation; vertical separation

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2009
• Volume: 2(2)
• Pages: 170-191

Dates

published

2009-12-01

Contributors

author

Marcin Król

• Collegium of World Economy, Warsaw School of Economics

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