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European security – new threats and demands

The latest events in Ukraine show that European project became the object for hybrid warfare – coordinated, flexible and dynamic influence in artificially created instability on the key elements of ''victims`'' national security systems on their territories, beyond them and on the international level. It is realized by the network of various groups, operated from a single strategic centre. This influence is possible owing to European countries` contradictions, because of strenthening of antieuropean positions.

Unfortunately Europeans in this context underestimate state, tendencies and foreseen consequences of Russian-European confrontation. As a result of absence of unity within EU, hesitation between American and Russian development vectors, sometimes absolutely national (not European) direction, chaotic forming of EU geostrategic line, there appears the possibility of arising of complicated mixture of threats for European security in general.

After 1991 the concept of EU foreign policy in the postsoviet spaces was based on the idea of cooperation with Russian Federation, which seemed to control these areas, to follow the way of democratic reforms and to lead other former Soviet republics on this way. EU and RF didn't exclude mutual integration. Decisive step act in realization of these aspirations became the *Treaty on European Union 1992*[1]. Russia formulated its own symmetric document – *Russia strategy on EU till 2010 p.*, aimed at building united Europe without dividing lines, interconnected and balanced strengthening of Russia and EU in international community[2].

Simultaneously Russia hoped to exclude or at least postpone European eastward expansion, first of all on the Baltic territory, limiting Russian geopolitical impact in Eastern Europe. Bilateral agreements on partnership and cooperation between European Union and former Soviet republics were considered alarming.

Almost all these documents anticipated EU eastern neighbour's adaptation to the system of European values and priorities. Officially, such a relationship with Ukraine was framed in 1994 by signing *The Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the European Community and Ukraine*.

A qualitatively new stage of europolicy on the former Soviet spaces began with the speech of the European Commission President R. Prodi in 2002[3] and New Neighbours Initiative, oriented on Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine[4]. Ukraine received special neighbour status and in 2004 – immediate border with the new EU members – Poland

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[1] S.U. Kashkin, *The law of the European Union*, The State Law Moscow Academy, M.: Prospect 2011, p. 30.

[2] *Russian Federation and European Union relations Strategy in the medium term (2000–2010)*, MSIIR University, http://www.mgimo.ru/files2/y11_2013/243404/4.4.strategy_russia_relations_eu.htm.

[3] R.A. Prodi, *Wider Europe – a Proximity Policy as the key to stability: Speech at the Sixth ECSA World Conference. Brussels 5–6 December 2002*, http://www.europa.eu/ jnt/comm/commissioneres/prodi/speeches/index_en.htm.

[4] Follow-up to the European Council in Brussels (24–25 October 2002), Brussels, November 18, 2002, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/73248.pdf, p. 13.

and the Baltic countries. New members started to form special geopolitic space, proclaimed their mission of assisting eastern neighbours in reforming, democratization and distancing from Russia[5].

The climax of this was the failure of "Wide Europe" concept, Russia adaptation to EU standards according to the results of Petersburg Summit 2003 and European Parliament resolution on relations between the EU and Russia[6]. Russian-European relations entered the rivalry stage, able to cause confrontation.

In 2007–2008 formal negotiations on the new quality of relations between Ukraine and the European Commission, signing *Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area* (DCFTA), started[7]. At the initiative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Sikorsky the program *Eastern Partnership* (EP) was launched (main partners – Poland and Lithuania). It was aimed at convergence, political association and economic integration with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine.

EP officially assumes such inter-regional dialogue platforms, democracy, good governance and stability, economic integration and convergence with EU policies, energy security, contacts between people[8].

However, firstly, despite the fact that about half of all project assets was designed to its main participant – Ukraine, the EU relations with Ukraine remain functional part of its relations with Russia. The exception is Poland, where development of relations with Ukraine is considered the part of their europolicy. Its initiative in 2011 resulted in the EuroNest and the Polish-Ukrainian forum. It meant actual EP output beyond the program according to the Polish scenario.

Secondly, against the background of the present geopolitical reality these platforms seemed to be minor. Their range unjustifiably excludes cooperation in the military sphere and challenges to European security.

In our opinion, it identifies the main problem of EP for today and points to the need of forming new platforms of inter-regional dialogue.

Many European researchers realize that Ukraine is forced to restore its cultural space as well as the European civilizational space by the cost of human lives.

Simultaneously our country faced the challenges to European security, the danger of which Europeans do not fully understand. In its turn, Russian political establishment considers EP as well as NATO to be a threat to Russia's interests, an attempt of post-soviet disintegration.

In the view of the acute security challenges in the European geopolitical interests' sphere, developed by Russia by exploiting current crisis, disintegration, discrediting European integration, military and intelligence-subversive activities, for the purpose of the effective counteraction it would be logical to create an additional EP platform – "European Security".

It should be based on the issue of strengthening solidarity of EU Member States and participants of the Eastern Partnership in the sphere of geopolitical threats counter-

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[5] *European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper*, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004DC0373&f rom=EN.

[6] Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on relations with Russia: EU Commission document COM(2004) 106, Brussels, February 9, 2004, p. 3.

[7] *EU–Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area*, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_150981.pdf, 9 p.

[8] *Eastern Partnership*, http://www.kmu.gov.ua/kmu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=248068721&cat_id=223345569.

action, national defense and security systems development, as well as integration into the European space, harmonizing policies in the field of national and common security. This platform`s flagship initiatives could be formulated as "Comprehensive Analysis of Potential Threats", "The Development and Implementation of Preventive Measures".

As a whole, Ukraine is moving closer to the EU and away from Russia economically and politically against the background of a deep economic and political crisis. Hybrid warfare sharpened the crisis, social tensions, intensified the need for foreign financial support in order to save the economic and the political system from collapse.

Russian-Euroatlantic geopolitical rivalry resulted in Maidan bloody confrontation, anti-terrorist operation in eastern Ukraine, implementing scenarios of controlled chaos. It was the price for signing "economic section" of the *Agreement about Association* in 2014. But even after the tragic events on Ukrainian way to Europe it didn't mean European unanimity and unity.

Europe has not served as a subject of international relations yet. In fact, the prevailing trend is replacing "defense" with "politics" and general philosophy of EU interest[9]. Ch. Patten, Commissioner for External Relations of the EU, aptly noted: (...) *EU occasionally publishes conscript declarations, usually a few weeks after important international events,* (…) *acting as a commentator, not a functioning entity*[10]. All this gives rise to ideological differences of the EU members' elites in understanding security problems, their ambiguous perceptions of European issues. The reason for this is not only a variety of geopolitical thoughts, but legal specific features of Europe construction.

Under Article 17 of *the Treaty of Nice*, the common security policy has no right to bring damage to foreign policy of individual countries and their commitment concerning participation in NATO and other organizations. The commonly adopted policy cannot affect the exclusive interests of the foreign policies of individual states[11]. According to the American experts, EU foreign policy resembles normal interstate coordination[12].

In fact, the EU has no unifying foreign policy and geostrategy. Each country creates its geospace, guided by the principles of national egoism. Under such conditions of the EU geopolitical unity, the reforms of the existing organizational structure of the European security sphere are needed.

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[9] J. Dobbins, *Friends again?* in: *Friends again? EU-US relations after the crisis*, M. Zaborowski (ed.), Paris 2006, p. 26–27.

[10] Ch. Patten, *The European Union and the World*, in: *Europe in the New Century. Visions of an Emerging Superpower*, R. Guttman (ed.), London 2001, p. 79.

[11] *Treaty of Nice*. Amending the *Treaty on the European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts* (2001/C 80/01), "Official Journal of the European Communities", March 10, 2001.

[12] B. White, *Understanding European Foreign Policy*, Hampshire–N.Y. 2001, p. 100.