Are we done with preference rankings? If we are, then what?

• Authors: Hannu NURMI
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Intransitive, incomplete and discontinuous preferences are not always irrational but may be based on quite reasonable considerations. Hence, we pursue the possibility of building a theory of social choice on an alternative foundation, viz. on individual preference tournaments. Tournaments have been studied for a long time independently of rankings and a number of results are therefore just waiting to be applied in social choice. Our focus is on Slater’s rule. A new interpretation of the rule is provided.

Keywords

EN

preferences; Slater’s rule; social choice

• Publisher: Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
• Journal: Operations Research and Decisions
• Year: 2014
• Volume: 24
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 63-74

Contributors

author

Hannu NURMI

• Department of Political Science and Contemporary History, University of Turku, 20500 Turku, Finland

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Identifiers

DOI

10.5277/ord140405