The Value of Knowledge

• Authors: Ryan Shane
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In this paper I make the case that we should reject an argument that even knowledge of pointless truths has pro tanto final value. The argument draws on Greco’s virtue epis-temological account of knowledge, according to which knowledge is an achievement and achievements have final value in virtue of being constitutive of the good life. I ar-gue for my position by drawing on a case of knowledge of a pointless truth unlike pre-vious cases of pointless truths discussed in the literature. This is a case in which knowledge of a pointless truth is very cheaply gained, and so it is a case in which the disvalue of the cost of gaining the knowledge cannot plausibly outweigh the supposed pro tanto final value of knowledge.

Keywords

EN

Knowledge; epistemic value; pointless truths; achievements; Greco

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk; Fundacja Filozofia Na Rzecz Dialogu
• Journal: Dialogue and Universalism
• Year: 2014
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 84-88

Contributors

author

Ryan Shane

• Soochow University in Taipei City