Czy wnioski z eksperymentów naukowych badających wolną wolę są uzasadnione? Przegląd i analiza krytyki eksperymentów Benjamina Libeta i Johna-Dylana Haynesa

• Authors: Marzec-Remiszewski Michał

Title variants

EN

Are the conclusions of the scientific experiments investigating free will justified? The analysis of the criticism concerning Libet’s and Haynes’ experiments

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

Scientific experiments which try to examine free will are faced with various critical arguments — both philosophical and methodological. In this article I will present the most important and the most interesting critical arguments attacking two the most influential experiments: Benjamin Libet experiment and John‐Dylan Haynes experiment. In the first part of the article I will consider a particular criticism of Libet paradigm, which loses its importance in context of Haynes paradigm. Next I will present critical arguments which attack both Haynes and Libet experiments (and probably all other psychophysiological experiments facing free will problem). Because of this analysis I will consider informative value of presented experiments in context of existence of free will.

Keywords

EN

free will; Libet’s experiment; Haynes’ experiment; determinism

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. KEN w Krakowie, Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
• Journal: ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
• Year: 2016
• Volume: Tom: 6
• Issue: Numer: 2
• Pages: 475-492

Dates

published

2016

Contributors

author

Marzec-Remiszewski Michał

• Uniwersytet Jagielloński w Krakowie

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