Uncertainty and Probability within Utilitarian Theory

• Authors: Baron Jonathan
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Probability is a central concept in utilitarian moral theory, almost impossible to do without. I attempt to clarify the role of probability, so that we can be clear about what we are aiming for when we apply utilitarian theory to real cases. I point out the close relationship between utilitarianism and expected-utility theory, a normative standard for individual decision-making. I then argue that the distinction between “ambiguity” and risk is a matter of perception. We do not need this distinction in the theory itself. In order to make this argument I rely on the personalist theory of probability, and I try to show that, within this theory, we do not need to give up completely on the idea that a “true probability” (other than 0 or 1) exists. Finally, I discuss several examples of applied utilitarianism, emphasizing the role of probability in each example: reasonable doubt (in law), the precautionary principle in risk regulation, charity, climate change, and voting.

Keywords

EN

utilitarianism; ambiguity; probability; expected utility

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii - Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Diametros
• Year: 2017
• Issue: 53
• Pages: 6-25

Dates

published

2017-09

Contributors

author

Baron Jonathan

• University of Pennsylvania

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Identifiers

DOI

10.13153/diam.53.0.1098