Arendt’s Phenomenology: Social-Political Thought and Ethical Life

• Authors: Wielgus Margot
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Hannah Arendt brings the traditionally ontological practice of phenomenology into social and political philosophy. She does this in two ways: by employing phenomeno-logical methods in her approach to examining the world around her and by showing how phenomenology is related to ethical life through her description of thinking. In this article, I explore the first of these ways by locating Arendt’s methods in relation to Martin Heidegger’s definition of phenomenology, as given in the Being and Time. Arendt’s usage of phenomenological methods is clear in her examinations of banal evil and modern judicial systems. These topics lead to a discussion of how thinking, for Arendt, is a phenomenological activity that has bearing on ethical life. I will turn to Arendt’s essay, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship” to clarify how phenome-nology, as characteristic of the thinking Arendt prescribes, is ethically important.

Keywords

EN

Hannah Arendt; phenomenology; thinking; evil; ethics; Martin Heidegger

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk; Fundacja Filozofia Na Rzecz Dialogu
• Journal: Dialogue and Universalism
• Year: 2015
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 115-125

Contributors

author

Wielgus Margot

• Auburn University, Department of Philosophy, 6080 Haley Center, Auburn, AL 36849 USA