THE DEBATE ON THE NORMATIVITY OF MEANING IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (Spór o normatywnosc znaczenia w analitycznej filozofii jezyka)

• Authors: Poslajko Krzysztof
• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

The thesis that meaning is normative, i.e. that statements ascribing meaning to sentences express norms, advocated by Kripke-Wittgenstein, has been subjected to numerous critical arguments. However, these doubts can be refuted if certain modifications are made. Firstly, one must reject Boghossian's requirement that a correct use is a true use and allow for correctness of speech acts which do not aim at truth. Secondly, one must reject conflation of correct use and correct application. Thirdly, the fact that the normativity of meaning sentences is not the normativity of moral sentences does not prove that meaning sentences are not normative in a different way. In line with the 'folk' theory of meaning, presented in the paper, the author accepts the meaning normativity thesis, which, however, does not mean embracing the existence of a set of rules shared by all users of a given language, which was questioned by Davidson. The idea that uses of language can be classified as correct or incorrect is central to our ordinary concept of meaning.

Keywords

EN

CORRECT USE; LANGUAGE; MEANING; NORMATIVITY; SENTENCE

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Polska Akademia Umiejętności / Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
• Year: 2009
• Volume: 37
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 123-155
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Poslajko Krzysztof

• Krzysztof Poslajko, Uniwersytet Jagiellonski, Instytut Filozofii, ul.Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków, Poland

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

09PLAAAA062211