Rule-Following, Meaning Constitution, and Enaction

• Authors: Patrizio Lo Presti
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The paper submits a criticism of the standard formulation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox. According to the standard formulation, influenced by Kripke, the paradox invites us to consider what mental or behavioral items could constitute meaning. The author proposes instead an enactivist understanding of the paradox. On this account there is no essential gap between mental items and behavioral patterns such that the paradox enforces a choice between meaning being constituted either internally ‘in mind,’ or externally ‘in behavior.’ The paper begins with an introduction to the paradox and then presents arguments against standard solutions. It ends with the enactivist proposal, admitting that although much more needs to be said before it can be established as a full-fledged alternative, it nonetheless holds some promise both for revising our understanding of the paradox and for the formulation of a novel solution.

Keywords

EN

Wittgenstein; rule-following; meaning; enaction; interaction

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Human Affairs
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 25
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 110-120

Dates

published

2015-01-01

online

2014-12-30

Contributors

author

Patrizio Lo Presti

• Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Lund University, LUX, Helgonavägen 3D,

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.1515/humaff-2015-0009