Professional lobbyists as representative claim-makers. The cases of Poland and the Czech Republic

• Authors: Jana Vargovčíková
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This article looks at the ways in which political representation is used as a symbolic resource of legitimacy by those acting as intermediaries between the private and the public sectors- professional lobbyists. Drawing on the theoretical framework of Michael Saward, the article puts forward an analysis of whether, how and in relation to whom, lobbyists claim to be representatives so as to acquire a recognized position in the policy-making process. Representative claim-making by lobbyists matters, we argue, because it is an indicator of the status afforded by the public to private actors in politics. In the Czech and Polish cases, even though the invisible character of lobbying practices seems to limit the range of roles lobbyists can adopt in front of the general public, lobbyists mobilize representation as a resource both directly and indirectly when having to justify their involvement in public decision-making

Keywords

EN

lobbying; Michael Saward; representation; claim-making

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Human Affairs
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 25
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 142-152

Dates

published

2015-04-01

online

2015-04-07

Contributors

author

Jana Vargovčíková

• Centre of Global Studies, Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague, U Kříže 8, 158 00 Praha 5, Czech Republic

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Identifiers

DOI

10.1515/humaff-2015-0013