The Evaluation of the Role of the Office for Protection of Competition of the Czech Republic in Regulating Public Procurement

• Authors: Michal Plaček , František Ochrana , Martin Schmidt , Milan Půček
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Our study offers additional insight into the Office for Protection of Competition. It examines the Office for Protection of Competition in terms of an input-process-output model, defines the inputs needed for its activities and examines the outputs of its control activities. It also identifies external factors (in the environment) that affect the performance and behavior of the Office for Protection of Competition and have an impact on inspection activities. The theoretical background as well as assumptions are then subjected to empirical scrutiny. Theoretical conclusions and recommendations for more effective control of public contracts are drawn from the conclusions which are established.

Keywords

EN

Office for Protection of Competition; input-process-output model; public procurement; Czech Republic

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 9
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 97-116

Dates

published

2016-06-01

online

2016-08-02

Contributors

author

Michal Plaček

• All: Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Smetanovo nábřeží 995/6, Prague, Czech Republic.

author

František Ochrana

• All: Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Smetanovo nábřeží 995/6, Prague, Czech Republic.

author

Martin Schmidt

• All: Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Smetanovo nábřeží 995/6, Prague, Czech Republic.

author

Milan Půček

• All: Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Smetanovo nábřeží 995/6, Prague, Czech Republic.

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Identifiers

DOI

10.1515/nispa-2016-0005