Evolved Mechanisms Versus Underlying Conditional Relations

• Authors: Miguel López Astorga
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The social contracts theory claims that, in social exchange circumstances, human reasoning is not necessarily led by logic, but by certain evolved mental mechanisms that are useful for catching offenders. An emblematic experiment carried out with the intention to prove this thesis is the first experiment described by Fiddick, Cosmides, and Tooby in their paper of 2000. Lopez Astorga has questioned that experiment claiming that its results depend on an underlying conditional logical form not taken into account by Fiddick, Cosmides, and Tooby. In this paper, I propose an explanation alternative to that of Lopez Astorga, which does not depend on logical forms and is based on the mental models theory. Thus, I conclude that this other alternative explanation is one more proof that the experiment in question does not demonstrate the fundamental thesis of the social contracts theory.

Keywords

EN

conditional relation; evolved mechanisms; mental models; reasoning; social contracts

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 40
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 241-253

Dates

published

2015-03-01

online

2015-04-10

Contributors

author

Miguel López Astorga

• Talca University (Chile)

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Identifiers

DOI

10.1515/slgr-2015-0012