Disagreement, Cognitive Command, and the Indexicality of Moral Truth

• Authors: Bastian Reichardt
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Moral Relativism can be considered an attractive alternative to realism because relativists can make good sense of cultural and societal disagreements by seeing them as faultless. However, we can show that this advantage is made possible by systematically disagreeing with moral phenomenology. Relativists make a substantial distinction between intercultural and intracultural discourses which turns out to be incoherent. This can be shown by making use of Crispin Wright’s notion of Cognitive Command.

Keywords

EN

relativism; metaethics; cognitive command; truth in ethics; disagreement

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 42
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 7-16

Dates

published

2015-09-01

online

2015-11-26

Contributors

author

Bastian Reichardt

• University of Bonn

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Identifiers

DOI

10.1515/slgr-2015-0027