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2012 | 21 | 4 | 391-414

Article title

Representing Concepts in Formal Ontologies: Compositionality vs. Typicality Effects

Title variants

Languages of publication

EN

Abstracts

EN
The problem of concept representation is relevant for many sub- fields of cognitive research, including psychology and philosophy, as well as artificial intelligence. In particular, in recent years it has received a great deal of attention within the field of knowledge representation, due to its relevance for both knowledge engineering as well as ontology-based tech- nologies. However, the notion of a concept itself turns out to be highly disputed and problematic. In our opinion, one of the causes of this state of affairs is that the notion of a concept is, to some extent, heterogeneous, and encompasses different cognitive phenomena. This results in a strain be- tween conflicting requirements, such as compositionality, on the one hand and the need to represent prototypical information on the other. In some ways artificial intelligence research shows traces of this situation. In this paper, we propose an analysis of this current state of affairs. Since it is our opinion that a mature methodology with which to approach knowledge representation and knowledge engineering should also take advantage of the empirical results of cognitive psychology concerning human abilities, we outline some proposals for concept representation in formal ontologies, which take into account suggestions from psychological research. Our basic assumption is that knowledge representation systems whose design takes into account evidence from experimental psychology (and which, therefore, are more similar to the human way of organizing and processing informa- tion) may therefore give better results in many applications (e.g. in the fields of information retrieval and semantic web).

Year

Volume

21

Issue

4

Pages

391-414

Physical description

Dates

published
2012-12-01
online
2013-07-02

Contributors

  • DAFIST University of Genova, Italy
author
  • Department of Computer Science University of Turin, Italy

References

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Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.doi-10_2478_llc-2012-0018
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