Interactive Logic in the Middle Ages

• Authors: Sara L. Uckelman
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Recently logic has shifted emphasis from static systems developed for purely theoretical reasons to dynamic systems designed for application to real world situations. The emphasis on the applied aspects of logic and reasoning means that logic has become a pragmatic tool, to be judged against the backdrop of a particular application. This shift in emphasis is, however, not new. A similar shift towards “interactive logic” occurred in the high Middle Ages. We provide a number of different examples of “interactive logic” in the Middle Ages, all species of the disputation game obligatio. These games display a recognition of the importance of interaction in logical contexts and the way that interactive logic differs from single-agent inference.

Keywords

EN

disputation; interactive logic; obligatio

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń)
• Journal: Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Year: 2012
• Volume: 21
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 439-471

Dates

published

2012-12-01

online

2013-07-02

Contributors

author

Sara L. Uckelman

• Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg University PO Box 90153 5000LE Tilburg The Netherlands

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Identifiers

DOI

10.12775/LLP.2012.020